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Abstract. Inferentialism claims that the rules for the use of an expression express its
meaning without any need to invoke meanings or denotations for them. Logical inferential-
ism endorses inferentialism specifically for the logical constants. Harmonic inferentialism,
as the term is introduced here, usually but not necessarily a subbranch of logical inferential-
ism, follows Gentzen in proposing that it is the introduction-rules whch give expressions
their meaning and the elimination-rules should accord harmoniously with the meaning
so given. It is proposed here that the logical expressions are those which can be given
schematic rules that lie in a specific sort of harmony, general-elimination (ge) harmony,
resulting from applying a certain operation, the ge-procedure, to produce ge-rules in accord
with the meaning defined by the I-rules. Griffiths (2014) claims that identity cannot be
given such rules, concluding that logical inferentialists are committed to ruling identity
a non-logical expression. It is shown that the schematic rules for identity given in Read
(2004), slightly amended, are indeed ge-harmonious, so confirming that identity is a logical
notion.
Keywords: inferentialism, identity, inversion principle, harmony, proof-theoretic
semantics; Gentzen, Lorenzen, Prawitz, Dummett, Brandom, Griffiths.
§1. Inferentialism Inferentialism claims that the meaning of any expression
is given not by identifying some object as its meaning, but by stating the rules
for its use in inference, in particular, by stating the grounds on which state-
ments containing an expression can be asserted—that is, under what conditions
such statements can be inferred from others—and the consequences which such
assertions entail—that is, what statements can be inferred from such an assertion.
Logical inferentialists make the restricted claim that such an inferentialist account
is appropriate at least for the logical constants, whatever the appropriate story
is for non-logical expressions. Logical inferentialism champions a proof-theoretic
semantics in terms of rules of inference, as opposed to a model-theoretic semantics,
whereby the meaning of the logical constants is to be given by the recursive clauses
in the definition of a model.
Broad-brush inferentialism is espoused in Brandom (1994, 2000). There Brandom
contrasts material inferences with formal inference. The latter can be defined in
terms of the former, but not vice versa, he says (Brandom, 2000, p. 55). A formally
valid inference is a valid inference that “cannot be turned into a materially bad one
by substituting non-privileged for non-privileged vocabulary” (Brandom, 1994, p.
104). But what determines validity itself? The inferentialist idea espoused here is
this: when we add a word to our vocabulary, we (implicitly or explicitly) associate
it with grounds for asserting statements containing it. The collection of statements
warranted in this way is the introduction- (or I-)fragment. Certain statements
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involving the new term will be derivable in the I-fragment, but as yet, no inferences
from such assertions will be possible. Nonetheless, some such inferences will be
admissible: that is, if a certain statement involving the new term is derivable, then
certain other statements, containing the term or not, will also be derivable using the
rules for assertion. For example, suppose the rule for ‘true’ is that, if a statement
s is assertable, so is ‘s is true’. Call this Tr-I, or Tr-Introduction. Then it is clear
that if ‘s is true’ is assertable, so too will be s, since that is the only ground on
which ‘s is true’ can be asserted. That thought justifies adding the inference of s
from ‘s is true’ as an elimination- (or E-)rule.
Prawitz (1973, p. 234) summarizes the idea as follows:
“The main idea is this: while the introduction inferences represent
the form of proofs of compound formulas by the very meaning of
the logical constants . . . and hence preserve validity, other infer-
ences have to be justified by the evidence of operations of a certain
kind.”
Gentzen (1969, p. 81) proposed that “by making these ideas more precise, it should
be possible to display the E-inferences as unique functions of their corresponding
I-inferences on the basis of certain assumptions,”1 exhibiting classic examples. The
first attempt at generalising and making Gentzen’s ideas precise was due to Paul
Lorenzen with his idea of the inversion principle:
“A general formulation of an ‘inversion principle’ would be for
instance: given a system of rules such that for the derivation of
an expression p0 only the rules
p1 → p0; . . . ;pn → p0
(possibly containing bound variables) are needed, then for every
expression p, in which certain variables do not occur free, the meta-
rule [p1 → p; . . . ;pn → p]→ (p0 → p)
is valid.”2
Satisfaction of the inversion principle ensures that the E-rules generated are not
only individually no stronger than the I-rules warrant but collectively no weaker
than are warranted too. Lorenzen’s proposal has been developed in recent years into
the conception of general-elimination rules and of a general-elimination procedure
for generating those ge-rules.3 Suppose a logical expression ‘∗’, forming a wff ∗α⃗
1 “Durch Pra¨zisierung dieser Gedanken du¨rfte es mo¨glich sein, die B-Schlu¨sse auf
Grund gewisser Anforderungen als eindeutige Funktionen der zugeho¨rigen E-Schlu¨sse
nachzuweisen.” (Gentzen, 1935, p. 189)
2 “Eine allgemeine Formulierung eines ‘Inversionsprinzips’ wa¨re etwa: Ist ein System
von Regeln vorgegeben, so daß zur Ableitung einer Aussage p0 nur die Regeln p1 →
p0; . . . ;pn → p0 (evtl. mit gebundenen Variablen) benutzt werden ko¨nnen, so gilt fu¨r jede
Aussage p, in der gewisse Variable nicht frei vorkommen, die Metaregel p1 → p; . . . ;pn →
p
.→ p0 → p.” (Lorenzen, 1950, p. 176) In Lorenzen (1955, §1.4), he attempted to spell
out the necessary conditions on the bound variables, later corrected in Hermes (1959).
3 See, e.g., von Plato (2001) and Read (2010). The general-elimination procedure
proposed in Francez & Dyckhoff (2012) is significantly different from that given here.
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from a collection α⃗ of 0 or more arguments, has m I-rules (m ≥ 0), each of the form:
pii1 . . . piini∗α⃗ ∗Ii
Here each piij ,0 ≤ j ≤ ni, the j-th premise of the rule, is a derivation of some wff, γij ,
from assumptions {pik ∶ k ∈Kij} which are discharged by the rule. (In the simplest
case, Kij = ∅.) These I-rules generate a collection of E-rules each of the form:
∗α⃗
[pi1j(1)]....
ζ . . .
[pimj(m)]....
ζ
ζ
∗Ej
(j ∈ ⨉mi=1 ni) each minor premise of which is a derivation of a common wff ζ on
the assumption of one of the premises of each I-rule, where that assumption is
discharged by the E-rule.4
That the E-rules are no stronger than is warranted is shown by a local reduction,
demonstrating that anything following from ∗α⃗ by ∗Ej already follows from the
grounds for assertion of ∗α⃗:5
....
pii1 . . .
....
piini∗α⃗ ∗Ii
[pi1j(1)]....
ζ . . .
[pimj(m)]....
ζ
ζ
∗Ej
simplifies to
....
piij(i)....
ζ
Thus {∗Ej ∶ j ∈ ⨉mi=1 ni} warrant assertion of no more than is already warranted by
the grounds for asserting ∗α⃗ given in {∗Ii ∶ i ≤m}.
But more: recall that we are adding the logical constant ‘∗’ by the rules {∗Ii ∶
i ≤ m} to an atomic basis which lacks the expression ‘∗’—and if there are other
logical constants, we are considering so far only the I-fragment which their I-rules
define. Hence the rules in {∗Ii ∶ i ≤ m} give the only grounds for asserting ∗α⃗.
Accordingly, if some application of ∗Ej warrants assertion of ζ, then ∗α⃗ must
already be warranted, and so once again, what warrants ζ is the warrant for ∗α⃗ (plus
warrants for any parametric assumptions for the premises). Thus {∗Ej ∶ j ∈ ⨉mi=1 ni}
warrant assertion of anything which grounds the assertion of ∗α⃗. The rules for ‘∗’
are complete. Moriconi & Tesconi (2008, p. 105) put the point as follows:
4 Where for some i, ∗Ii allows discharge of an assumption, ∗Ej will be a higher-level rule
in the sense of Schroeder-Heister (1984).
5 See Prawitz (1965, ch. II §2). In general, in the presence of other connectives, we may
need to perform so-called permutative reductions to permute the application of ∗Ej
with other E-rules to bring ∗Ii and ∗Ej into contact. See, e.g., Dummett (1977, p. 112)
and (1991, p. 250).
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“[A]ll ∗-propositions are obtained . . . [that is,] completeness is at-
tained if whenever a ∗-proposition [∗α⃗] satisfies a certain condition
[namely, that expressed in the set of E-rules] and the [introduction-]rule
for ‘∗’ states that [∗α⃗ can be inferred from Y ] then the underlying
implicational structure guarantees that [Y satisfies the condition
too].”
§2. Harmonic Inferentialism It is tempting to think that the inferential
system for a term introduced in this way will be a conservative extension of the
system to which the term was added. Prawitz, in his review of Dummett (1991),
pointed out that this temptation is mistaken, noting in particular the case of adding
terms like ‘true’:
“. . . because we know from Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem . . .
that the addition to arithmetic of higher order concepts may lead
to an enriched system that is not a conservative extension of the
original in spite of the fact that some of these concepts are governed
by rules that must be said to satisfy the requirement of harmony.”6
‘Harmony’ was the epithet coined by Dummett (1973, p. 396) to capture the idea
that the two sorts of rule (I-rules and E-rules) should exhibit “a certain consonance
between the two aspects of the use of a given form of expression” (Dummett, 1973,
p. 397), that is, between the grounds for assertion and the consequences of such
assertions. In fact, for Dummett harmony is a relatively weak notion:
“Harmony is an excessively modest demand . . . It does not show
that . . . we are accustomed to draw all those consequences we
should be entitled to draw.” (Dummett, 1991, p. 287)
When the E-rules allow all and only the warranted consequences to be drawn,
Dummett called the set of I- and E-rules ‘stable’. We have seen that the inversion
principle ensures that the ge-rules generated by a set of I-rules form with them
a stable set of rules. Stability ensures that not only do the I-rules justify the E-
rules, but in addition, the E-rules justify the (very same) I-rules. It ensures the
consonance behind the original conception of harmony.7
Steinberger (2011, p. 619) claims that the basis of harmony is a principle of
innocence:
6 Prawitz (1994, p. 374). See also Brandom (1994, p. 127), who expresses similar
reservations. Sundholm (1998, p. 202) spelled the point out: “The truth of the [Go¨del]
proposition has not been demonstrated solely according to the rules and axioms of the
original formalism . . . [W]hat is called for . . . is the use of the concept of truth for
sentences in the arithmetical language.”
7 See also Zucker & Tragesser (1978, p. 506), who propose that the E-rules “stabilize or
delimit the meaning of the logical constant concerned, by saying, in effect, of the given
I-rules: ‘These are the only ways in which this constant can be introduced’.”
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“It should not be possible, solely by engaging in deductive logical
reasoning, to discover hitherto unknown (atomic) truths that we
would have been incapable of discovering independently of logic.”
That the harmony of a term’s rules does not mean that its addition always consti-
tutes a conservative extension of the atomic basis shows that Steinberger’s principle
is mistaken. The point of harmony is that the consequences drawn from an assertion
(by the E-rules) should be no more than is justified by the grounds for their assertion
(encapsulated in the I-rules), but those I-rules themselves can be creative, as is
the case with the truth predicate of arithmetic. Addition of the truth predicate
allows one to prove the Go¨del sentence of the original theory, which is a purely
number-theoretic truth. Often the rules are not creative in that way (as with the
standard connectives of propositional logic), but nothing in Dummett’s conception
of harmony as consonance between the two aspects of an assertion rules this out.
Steinberger (2011, p. 629) goes on to speak of a core notion of ideal harmony:
“Let us, in this hopeful vein, refer to the conjunction of levelling
procedures [i.e., harmony] and a stability requirement designed to
ward off E-weak disharmony [i.e., that the E-rules are weaker than
the I-rules warrant] as ideal harmony.”
He notes (2011, p. 634) that Dummett conjectured that ideal harmony entails what
Dummett calls total harmony (viz conservative extension), but concedes (2011, p.
630) that this conjecture is mistaken: “Conceptual progress in the sciences . . . leads
to non-conservative extensions” (2011, p. 619). Consequently, Steinberger is wrong
to argue that innocence is essential to the role logic plays. Two mistaken but related
ideas dominated thought about logic in the twentieth century. One was that all
logical consequence is formal; the other that logic is empty. The connection between
the two ideas is the thought that all content is contained in the non-logical terms,
and logical consequence is simply truth-preservation through all substitutions for
the non-logical terms. This is the real basis of Steinberger’s principle of innocence—
more a principle of impotence, of the impotence and emptiness of logic as proclaimed
by Wittgenstein and trumpeted by the logical positivists.8 Logic is seen as a purely
formal matter and not one of sense or content. But this is a mistake. Inferentialism
recognises that the logical constants also have content, that content being implicitly
defined by the rules of usage. Adding harmonious rules for truth allows us to prove
the Go¨del sentence and relative consistency.
What has to be accepted is that, although their ultimate aim is the same, namely,
an account of the meaning of logical constants in purely proof-theoretical terms,
different authors have different conceptions of harmony—intrinsic harmony, total
harmony, ideal harmony and so on. The expression “general-elimination harmony”
was coined by Francez & Dyckhoff (2012) to characterise the notion of harmony
captured by the ge-procedure. However articulated, harmony restricts inferentialism
to exclude connectives like Prior’s notorious tonk.9 I will use “harmonic inferen-
tialism” to refer to the subclass of (logical) inferentialism by which the meaning of
8 See, e.g., Wittgenstein (1961, §5.43): “All the propositions of logic say the same thing,
to wit nothing.” See also §6.11.
9 See Prior (1960) and Read (2010, p. 561).
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each logical constant is wholly given by its I-rules, and the E-rules are no stronger
and no weaker than that meaning warrants, and so are in harmony with them.
Brandom (1994, p. 130) endorses Dummett’s requirement that the two aspects
of use of an expression should lie in such an intuitive harmony:
“The expressive task of making material inferential commitments
explicit plays an essential role in the reflectively rational Socratic
practice of harmonizing our commitments.”
Within the class of materially valid inferences, as we noted, Brandom distinguishes
a class of formal validities, namely, those in which truth is preserved through all
substitutions for the non-privileged vocabulary. Where the privileged vocabulary
consists of logical constants, we have a logically valid inference.
§3. Logical Constants Having clarified harmonic inferentialism as a special
form of logical inferentialism, we now need to consider what marks out the log-
ical constants. The issue is particularly pressing for those who advocate what
Etchemendy (1990, ch. 4) called interpretational semantics. Logical consequence
holds, Tarski said, when truth is preserved through all possible interpretations of
the non-logical terms. The view was articulated by Tarski (2002, p. 186) and before
him by Bolzano.10 But as Etchemendy (1990, pp. 109-10) observed, the plausibility
of this definition depends on where the line is drawn between the logical terms and
the others. Tarski tried to address this concern in his posthumous paper (Tarski,
1986), suggesting that the logical notions are those preserved under all permutations
of the domain. The upshot, he realised (Tarski, 1986, p. 151) is that logicality
becomes identified with questions of cardinality—which should give one pause, for
that seems to identify logic with mathematics (or at least, set theory).
Many inferentialists propose that the logical constants are precisely those that can
be characterised by harmonious inference rules.11 Dummett (1991, p. 247) writes:
“The demand that the introduction rules and the elimination rules
be in harmony is . . . compelling when it is being maintained that
the meaning of the logical constant in question can be completely
determined by laying down the fundamental laws governing it.”12
This is too strong, given Dummett’s account of harmony as conservative extension.
Again, even though classical negation is given inharmonious rules in Gentzen’s NK
and Prawitz’s ND, it was argued in Read (2000, §3.3) that it can be given harmo-
nious rules in a multiple-conclusion natural deduction system. Nor does Dummett’s
alternative suggestion of identifying harmony (under the name, ‘intrinsic harmony’)
with normalization give a necessary or sufficient condition for logicality. The Curry-
Fitch-Prawitz (CFP) rules for ‘◻’ and ‘◊’ normalize,13 but as argued in Read (2008)
they are not really harmonious, for the I-rules confer different meanings from what
10 See Tarski (2002, p. 193 n. I).
11 Prawitz, Dummett and Zucker and Tragesser are listed among those advocating this
view in MacFarlane (2015, n. 20).
12 However, he does qualify his demand: he says (Dummett, 1991, p. 215) that they ought
to satisfy the condition, but that often they don’t, yet are still meaningful.
13 Prawitz (1965, ch. VI §1). See also Curry (1950, ch. V) and Fitch (1952, ch. 3).
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would justify the corresponding E-rule. The meaning of ◊α is not given by the CFP◊I-rule, nor does the meaning of ‘◻’ really justify their ◻E-rule except in those logics
as strong as T.14 Thus on the general-elimination account of harmony, inferentially
equivalent rules need not be equally harmonious. Whether a set of I- and E-rules
is ge-harmonious is not simply a matter of what can be inferred; it is also required
that the full meaning is expressed by the I-rules, and that the E-rules are generated
in accordance with that meaning by the ge-procedure.
Recall the contrast drawn in §1. above between formal validity and material valid-
ity. This too depends on distinguishing between logical and non-logical vocabulary.
What is formally valid is what is valid by the meaning of the logical constants alone,
regardless of the non-logical vocabulary. The distinction goes back to the middle
ages. Buridan (2014, I 4, p. 68) wrote:
“An inference (consequentia) is called formal if it is valid in all
terms retaining a similar form,”
distinguishing the (non-logical) terms from the (logical) form. The success of this
definition depends on two things: first, a prior notion of validity; secondly, a clear
characterization of ‘form’. The former was given in the observation that the rules
are complete in §1. The latter requires clarification of the notion of logical form.
Consider Aristotle’s account of syllogistic validity. He first distinguishes the four
forms of categorical (that is, subject-predicate) proposition, A, E, I and O, where the
predicate is said of all, none, some and not all of the subject, and then characterizes
the three figures (schemata) of pairs of such propositions by whether the middle
(or shared) term is predicate of one and subject of the other, predicate of both,
or subject of both. Syllogistic validity is formal, depending on whether truth is
preserved whatever (real, material) terms are substituted for the schematic letters
in those three schemata. We can see this most clearly in Aristotle’s method of
counterinstances, showing which pairs of subject-predicate forms are not productive
of a conclusion of the appropriate shape. What Aristotle was able to do was to
give inference rules involving conversion, reductio and ecthesis, for deriving all the
productive pairs, the categorical syllogisms.
Aristotle later added chapters attempting the same task for the modal syllogism.
Reflection on a similar challenge for modern modal logic is salutary. What are the
grounds on which ◊α can be asserted? The CFP I-rule is too weak, inferring ◊α
from α itself. If that were the sole ground for asserting ◊α, then modalities would
collapse and ‘◊’ would just mean ‘true’, not ‘possibly true’. One needs to discern
more in the logical form of ◊α, and introduce more structure into the proof theory.
There are many ways to do this: labelled deductive systems, hybrid logic, tree-
hypersequents and so on.15 What this means for our present reflections is that the
concept of form, and with it, formal validity, is underspecified. Propositions do not
have a single logical form, or even a single most specific form. It is clear that the
logic of some concepts can be captured purely schematically, ‘and’ for example.
14 Indeed, for that very reason, Prawitz (1979, pp. 34-36) rejects the modal operators as
not properly logical.
15 See, e.g., Negri (2005), Brau¨ner (2014), Poggiolesi (2011, ch. 10).
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(Even this needs qualifying: the schematic I-rule for ‘∧’:
α β
α ∧ β ∧I
captures a certain refined, abstracted, concept of conjunction, ignoring niceties such
as the implications of word order, for example.) Perhaps the logic of others, e.g.,
colour terms, cannot.16 In between we have notions such as ‘possible’ whose logical
behaviour is amenable to formal treatment given sufficient apparatus.
Ge-harmony requires that the introduction-rules give the full meaning of the ex-
pression in question, and the elimination-rule be constructed by the ge-procedure to
allow one to infer no more and no less than is warranted by the meaning so conferred.
On such a view, the logical constants are those which can be given schematic rules
satisfying general-elimination harmony. In consequence, the meanings encapsulated
in the I- and E-rules will be the same, and that meaning can easily be read off
from the I-rules, the rules for asserting statements with the expression as main
connective. Their meaning consists in the various grounds for their assertion.
§4. Identity In a recent article, Griffiths (2014) challenges this proposal, with
specific reference to rules proposed in Read (2004) for identity. Griffiths (2014, §7)
claims that if a connective is defined by inharmonious rules, then harmonious rules
cannot be given for it. This is a bold claim, and one that needs to be examined with
care. Much was wrong, indeed, with the treatment of identity in Read (2004),17 or
rather with its articulation, for, as I will argue, the basic idea was correct. There
are also major problems with Griffiths’ arguments. It is, therefore, worth turning
to discuss the logic of identity in some detail.
The problem identified for the logic of identity in Read (2004) was that the
meaning conferred on ‘=’ by the standard introduction-rule for identity:
a = a Refl
does not seem to justify the standard elimination-rule:18
a = b αax
αbx
Congr
The E-rule was described as an expression of the indiscernibility of identicals (Read,
2004, p. 115). This is misleading. Congr is formulated in a language with limited
expressive power, essentially extensional. Although the proposal was not specific
16 Brandom generalizes the inferentialist account to include so-called language-entry and
-exit transitions, but as such they are not schematic. See, e.g., Brandom (2007, p.
658): “Thus the visible presence of red things warrants the applicability of the concept
red . . . the point is that the connection between those circumstances of application
and whatever consequences of application the concept may have can be understood
to be inferential in a broad sense, even when the items connected are not themselves
sentential.”
17 See, e.g., Kremer (2007).
18 Here, αax denotes the result of replacing every free occurrence of ‘x’ by ‘a’ if ‘x’ is free
for ‘a’ in α, and if not, the result of replacing every free occurrence of ‘x’ by ‘a’ in a
well-defined bound alphabetic variant of α in which ‘x’ is free for ‘a’.
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about the logics to which the rules might be added, it was intended for some form of
first-order non-modal language, suitable for the expression of classical, intuitionist
or relevant logic.19 So Congr expresses the indiscernibility of identicals by first-order
non-modal expressions. Its converse is therefore the identity of objects indiscernible
by first-order non-modal predicates. The suggestion (Read, 2004, p. 116) was that
a suitable I-rule that would generate Congr as E-rule by the ge-procedure would
be: [Fa]
....
Fb
a = b = I
where the predicate variable ‘F ’ does not occur in any parametric assumptions (and
so is arbitrary).20 This was a simplification of an apparently weaker rule with two
premises: [Fa]
....
Fb
[Fb]
....
Fa
a = b = I′
to which it was argued to be equivalent. They have a different effect, however, on
the ge-procedure, which generates two E-rules from =I′:
a = b
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Fa⋮
Fb
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦....
ζ
ζ
and a = b
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Fb⋮
Fa
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦....
ζ
ζ
which simplify by reasoning elaborated in Read (2015, §3) to the “flattened rules”:
a = b Fa
Fb
= E1 and a = b Fb
Fa
= E2
The difference in the ge-procedure turns out to be important. In Read (2004),
appeal was made to a second-order comprehension principle to show that the E-rule,
stated there and above for atomic wffs in minor premise and conclusion, generalised
to Congr, that is, holds for arbitrary wffs. But the pair of rules, =E1 and =E2, allow
one to derive Congr by a simple induction over the degree of α, as one of a pair of
valid rules:
a = b αax
αbx
Congr and
a = b αbx
αax
Congr′
19 For the theory of identity in a modal language, see, e.g., da Costa & Mortensen (1980).
Identity can be defined in a second-order language: see, e.g., Shapiro (1991, pp. 67-8).
20 Griffiths (2014, p. 502) writes: “F is a schematic variable ranging over predicates of any
adicity and degree of complexity.” Not so: ‘F ’ ranges simply over monadic predicate
letters, such that ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ are atomic wffs.
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=E1 and =E2 give the atomic basis. Now suppose Congr and Congr
′ hold for
arbitrary α. To show that they hold for ¬α, we proceed as follows:
a = b αbx (1)
αax
Ind.Hyp. ¬αax ¬E¬αbx ¬I(1)
and similarly for Congr′. Moreover, if Congr and Congr′ hold for α and β, then
they hold for α ∧ β:
a = b (α ∧ β)axαax ∧E1
αbx
Ind.Hyp.
a = b (α ∧ β)axβax ∧E2
βbx
Ind.Hyp.
(α ∧ β)bx ∧I
and similarly for Congr′. The same method extends to the other connectives.
The rules =I′, Congr and Congr′ are ge-harmonious. But as we noted, Griffiths
claims that harmonious rules cannot be given for a connective already defined
by inharmonious rules. How is this disagreement to be explained? Part of the
explanation lies in the fact that Griffiths and I spell out the notion of harmony
in different ways. But that is not the full story. Griffiths observes that =I as given
in Read (2004) is in fact equivalent to Refl: the only wffs provable with =I have
the form ‘a = a’; and the =E-rule is the same, viz Congr. We noted earlier that
inferentially equivalent rules can differ in that one set is harmonious, the other
not. But here it is different: the I-rules on their own are inferentially equivalent,
and so give the same meaning to ‘=’. Thus if one I-rule is harmonious with Congr
then so is the other. The meaning of ‘=’ is given by the rules for its assertion; and
Refl and =I′ (and =I) are equivalent in that they each only permit assertions of
self-identity, a = a. So we must agree with Griffiths that the pairs of rules Refl and
Congr, on the one hand, and =I′ and Congr, on the other, cannot differ in one
pair being harmonious, the other not, for the meaning defined by each I-rule is the
same. Consequently, he writes (Griffiths, 2014, pp. 499, 501, 504):
“Because the old rules [i.e., Refl and Congr] are not harmonious
(as Read argues), nor are his [i.e., =I and Congr] . . .
[Refl] and [Congr] are clearly not harmonious . . .
[I]t is uncontroversial that the original rules are unharmonious by
this intuitive notion [viz “two rules’ being exactly commensurate
in strength”]: all the inferentialists I can find who comment on
identity, including Read, admit this.”
So we do; but none of us proves it, and no argument was given for this claim in
Read (2004). Griffiths has shown we were wrong. Refl is not in the right form of an
I-rule, viz specifying the grounds for assertion of wffs of the form ‘a = b’, to which
to apply the ge-procedure to generate the appropriate E-rule(s), that is, a set of
E-rules “commensurate in strength”. Once the I-rule is put in the right form, viz
=I′, the procedure shows that Congr is (one part of) the correct E-rule. Then =I′,
Congr and Congr′ lie in ge-harmony, so Refl and Congr must also be harmonious,
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for =I′ and Refl, being inferentially equivalent, give the same meaning to ‘=’, and
Congr (and Congr′) are justified by the meaning so given.
Griffiths (2014, p. 507) infers from his claim that harmonious rules cannot be
given that inferentialists must deny that identity is a logical notion. He attributes to
me (2014, pp. 505-6) the view that “formulability in terms of harmonious inference
rules is neither necessary nor sufficient for logical constanthood . . . [but] desirable.”
But here he conflates rules for an expression’s being actually harmonious with
whether harmonious rules can be formulated. E.g., I argued (2010, p. 561) that the
CFP rules for ‘◻’ and ‘◊’ are not harmonious, but in Read (2008) I showed that
the labelled rules for modality given in, e.g., Basin et al. (1997) were harmonious.
The modal case is not the same as that with identity, where the rules Refl and =I
are equivalent. The failure of harmony in the case of the CFP rules for possibility
is one of I-weak disharmony, as dubbed by Steinberger (2011, p. 621): that is, the
CFP ◊I-rule is too weak to justify the restrictions that need to be placed on the◊E-rule to ensure that between them they characterise possibility. But it does not
follow that ‘◊’ cannot be given harmonious rules. It can, but only by ensuring that
the I-rule properly captures the meaning of ‘◊’. The real basis of harmony is to
ensure that the meaning justifying the E-rules should be the same as that given
by the I-rules, so that the full meaning of the term in question is contained in the
grounds for assertion. This wasn’t true in the case of the CFP rules for ‘◊’. We now
see, thanks to Griffiths’ observations, that it is in the case of Refl, but obscurely
so, made clear by reformulating the I-rule for ‘=’ as =I′ (or =I).
Harmonious formulability (specifically, ge-harmony) was proposed above as a
necessary condition for logicality to ensure that the ge-procedure can be applied.
What is not necessary, as I argued (2010, §7), is normalization and the eliminability
of local peaks (Dummett’s “intrinsic harmony”), contrary to what Griffiths (2014,
p. 504) suggests. He writes:
“The inference rules for $ are in GE harmony if there is a reduc-
tion procedure by which all local peaks with respect to $ can be
eliminated.”
Not so: I wrote (Read, 2010, p. 525): “harmony is not normalization,” giving
counterexamples where peaks can be levelled, but not eliminated. Sometimes when
one peak is levelled, another arises of equal height.
Moreover, ge-harmony is not in itself sufficient for logicality: broad-brush inferen-
tialism seeks harmonious rules for every meaningful expression. What distinguishes
the logical expressions is their formal nature, that is, their schematic formulability.
This is clearly an open-ended criterion: for example, the language may need to be
extended, as in the case of the labelled systems for modal logic. The concept of form
distinguishing the logical from the non-logical is to that extent underspecified.
The existence of ge-harmonious and schematic rules is both necessary and suffi-
cient for an expression to prove itself as a meaningful logical constant; moreover,
the above rules, =I′, Congr and Congr′, are ge-harmonious and schematic and so
show that identity is indeed a logical notion.
§5. Conclusion Inferentialism rejects the idea that semantics should consist
in a mapping of each expression onto a range of objects, and proposes instead
that the rules for an expression’s use, to wit, the assertion-conditions of statements
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containing it and the consequences of those assertions, express its meaning. In
particular, logical inferentialism claims that the introduction- and elimination-rules
for a logical constant give its semantics in proof-theoretic terms. They may do so
even if the rules are inharmonious, as happens with the CFP-rules for modality.
The rules are harmonious when no more can be inferred from a proposition than is
warrented by the grounds for its assertion. Harmonic inferentialism is the restriction
of inferentialism to the case where the I-rules fully specify the meaning of the term
in question and the E-rules are fully justified (so are no stronger and no weaker than
is warranted) by the meaning so conferred. It was proposed here that the logical
expressions are those which can be given schematic rules that accordingly satisfy
Lorenzen’s inversion principle, that what follows from an assertion is no more and
no less than what follows severally from its grounds.
Owen Griffiths (2014) claimed that not only are the standard rules for identity
not harmonious, but harmonious rules cannot be given for it. We have seen that this
is not so. The notion of general-elimination harmony captures the idea expressed in
the inversion principle, and gives specific content to the suggestion by Gentzen that
the E-rules for a logical constant are uniquely determined by the meaning conferred
on it by the I-rules. The rule =I′ given in §4. states the assertion-conditions for
statements of the form ‘a = b’, and generates the rules Congr and Congr′ by the ge-
procedure. But =I′ is in fact equivalent to Refl, as Griffiths observed. So although
Refl is not in the right form for application of the ge-procedure, Congr and Congr′
allow inference of no more and no less than the meaning encapsulated in =I′, or
equivalently in Refl. Refl and Congr are indeed harmonious, but one can only see
that fact when the I-rule is put in a form that makes clear what the meaning of
‘a = b’ is, that is, a form that makes explicit the grounds for asserting wffs of the
form ‘a = b’, as is done by (the equivalent rule) =I′. Thus ‘=’ has been shown, contra
Griffiths, to be expressible by harmonious rules and so to be a logical notion, as
claimed in Read (2004).
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